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Media reporting on the South China Sea dispute
Media coverage of the South China Sea dispute is 
weighted heavily toward US-China dynamics and 
obscures a richness of local and regional detail. 
Few areas of the world attract more media attention currently than the South China 
Sea. This key maritime waterway and resource zone in the western Pacific is at the 
heart of rising tensions between China and the United States, who are rattling sabres 
more vigorously at one another than at any time since the build-up to the Korean War 
seventy years ago. Despite their demonstrable mutual interdependence, neither side 
seems willing to cooperate constructively enough to avoid the first superpower conflict 
of the 21st century.
This, at least, is the dominant narrative driving Western perceptions of US-China 
relations in east Asia. There are valid concerns arising from mutual Sino-American 
antagonism. Conflict is certainly possible. But there is another story of the South China 
Sea less commonly told outside the region. This alternative narrative pays greater 
attention to the claims and counter-claims of all the parties to the South China Sea 
dispute, in which there is more at stake than the fortunes of the US and China alone. 
Dominant modes of mainstream media reporting obscure important local dynamics, 
disguising a richly textured picture of regional constraints and opportunities.
Sovereign Data looks at the South China Sea dispute in its regional context and 
identifies the value of greater visibility and more detailed understanding of this complex 
geopolitical landscape.
Multiple actors, multiple disputes
Readers of Western media could be forgiven for thinking that South China Sea 
developments are a singular dispute between the US and China; a ‘maritime game of 
chicken’, to use the popular phrase.1 On one side is an aggressive, revisionist China, 
with its sights set on regional, if not global hegemony. On the other, the US, concerned 
as much with its own decline as with China’s apparent rise. Chinese militarisation of the 
South China Sea is about projecting regional power and denying adversaries operating 
space in the western Pacific. US naval activities seek to rebuff China’s territorial 
expansion and preserve open sea lanes for the common good. These are caricatures, 
to be sure, but common enough in Western media. This type of framing underplays US-
China bilateral security initiatives and encourages scepticism about Chinese intentions 
at every turn. Moreover, the binary logic of this narrative encourages audiences to think 
in terms of conflict, rather than cooperation. Inevitably, perhaps, thoughts turn also 
to the likelihood of war. For some members of the commentariat, war with China is 
passing from ‘unthinkable’ to ‘inevitable’.2 Is it possible to avoid the ‘Thucydides Trap’, 
pundits ask, in which the clash of a rising power (China) and a dominant power (US) 
must always end in ‘bloodshed’?3
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Framing the dispute as contingent on US-China relations makes it easy to ignore 
or actively write off other factors that provide opportunities for understanding and 
engagement. The International Crisis Group describes the South China Sea as the 
‘cockpit of geopolitics’ in east Asia, such is its pivotal regional importance.4 Five countries 
— Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam — have competing territorial 
claims to islands in the area. Four others – Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand 
– also have reasons to protect their national interests in one of the world’s densest 
concentrations of maritime trade and resource exploitation.5 China and its eastern and 
southern neighbours are the principal actors in the South China Sea dispute, not the 
United States, a detail that would – if only it were recognised and acknowledged – better 
serve American interests. To write, for example, that ‘China’s territorial conflicts with 
its neighbours have little if any consequence for American security’, is misguided.6 If 
China’s South China Sea strategy were geared solely towards the US, then it might be 
true. But the picture is more complex. China has multiple lines of strategic interaction, 
of which its relationship with the US is but one. Chinese manoeuvres in the South 
China Sea cannot be understood properly unless the US-China dynamic is considered 
alongside a complex set of regional relationships – and understanding these dynamics 
is as important for US-China relations as for the region itself.
Shaping media narratives
The point is not lost on regional players. The US-China relationship is characterised 
by abrasive rhetoric and accusations of mutual misrepresentation. So too are relations 
between China and its maritime neighbours. All state parties to the disputes in the South 
China Sea have an interest in shaping media narratives to their own advantage and to 
decry and defuse the attempts of their rivals to do the same. Of particular current interest 
are rising tensions between China, the emerging partnership of Vietnam and Japan, 
and the Philippines. All parties have marshalled selective resources and arguments 
to support their claims, an accusation frequently levelled at China and Japan, but less 
often at states like Vietnam and the Philippines.7
Vietnam and China are engaged in at least six long-running territorial disputes and shots 
have been fired in anger over several of these. Worst amongst them was the Fiery Cross 
incident of 1988, in which dozens of Vietnamese soldiers were killed in the disputed 
Spratly Islands. In May 2014, a naval confrontation escalated tensions significantly 
and spurred the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Vietnam 
is a member but China is not, to more vocal criticism of China.8 Vietnam is investing 
in a greatly expanded submarine defence capability, ostensibly part of a programme 
of ‘modernisation’ but clearly in response to the Chinese threat.9 Significantly, it is also 
building strong military ties with Japan.10 Japan has legislated recently for its biggest 
shift in defence posture since World War II, relaxing the constraints on its armed forces 
acting in collective self-defence, including in support of its allies in the South China 
Sea.11 China has reacted angrily to the prospect of Japan once again becoming a 
regional military player.12
The Philippines have supported the Japanese position,13 while simultaneously backing 
the right of the US to exercise its navy in disputed waters.14 At the same time, it has 
identified China’s ‘deceitful rhetoric’ as an obstacle to dispute resolution.15 China 
responded to a Philippine documentary about the South China Sea in June 2015 with 
the accusation that it was spreading misinformation, incitement and false impressions 
of victimhood.16 A short while later China warned its neighbours against ‘excessive 
interpretations’ of Chinese naval drills in the region.17 It will be interesting to see what 
further media play is made by both sides, now that the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
in the Hague has agreed to adjudicate on the lawfulness of China’s claims against the 
Philippines in the South China Sea.18
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Regional criticism
These media representations of diplomatic to-and-fros only scratch the surface of 
regional politics in the South China Sea, but serve to illustrate the scope and texture of 
the ‘dispute’ in both space and time. Much Western reporting on the subject is excellent 
but it is often overlooked in mainstream news cycles titillated by prospects of major 
war rather than the finer grain of regional context. The criticism applies equally well to 
national media in the region. Some examples:
 ● In July 2015, a senior Philippine judge criticised domestic media for its lack of 
contextualisation of territorial claims against China, citing ‘shallow coverage’ as an 
obstacle to public comprehension of the official Philippine position.19 The implication 
is that Philippine media need to do more to explain both countries’ claims in the 
area the Philippines refers to as the West Philippine Sea. 
 ● One academic study finds that ASEAN media prioritise ‘war’ over ‘peace’ narratives 
in their support for Philippine claims against China.20 In this respect, Philippine 
media have much in common with their western counterparts. 
 ● Survey data also indicate that media narratives in the region are not always as 
effective as might be expected. Recent research in China, for example, suggests 
that although domestic audiences are swayed by belligerent discourses in 
mainstream and online media, and support for the use of armed force in the 
South China Sea remains high (46%), negotiated solutions receive even higher 
support (57%), and UN arbitration higher still (60%).21 This is an important potential 
corrective to dominant Western narratives of unchallenged Chinese control over 
political messages at home.
Outlook
China’s territorial claims are against its regional neighbours, not the United States. 
Those competing claims are often mentioned in Western media but are less often 
discussed in depth, and very rarely outside the rubric of the US-China relationship. 
This creates a false impression of the political situation in the South China Sea, over-
emphasising the centrality of the US and discounting the influence and interests of 
littoral states in the region. The prioritisation of the US-China conflict narrative is justified 
on account of these states’ global importance, but it also risks being consumed by its 
own logic of inevitability, thereby restricting debate and polarising opinion. Perhaps 
most relevant for outside observers – analysts and investors among them – is that 
such a limited view threatens to reduce the pool of available data on everything from 
emerging bilateral and multilateral arrangements to their potential economic impact on 
local industry and trade. 
Such complexity is underscored by recent developments that suggest China is willing 
to employ a range of tactics to press its South China Sea interests. Naval manoeuvres 
and environmental engineering in disputed waters are certainly headline items. So too 
should be the use of armed irregulars and – particularly notable – cyber warfare tactics.22 
China is thought to be responsible for taking offline the website of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration. What is extraordinary about this is that in a Western media climate 
obsessed with all things Chinese, especially as they pertain to cyber security, the attack 
on the court’s website has received almost no mainstream media coverage.23 China is 
accused of hacking into its systems to obtain an informational advantage in the case 
brought by the Philipipnes against Chinese territorial claims. Were this a US court, or if 
an American company or case was involved, the media would be aflame with reportage 
and opinion. As it stands, little external scrutiny is being applied, at least publicly. This 
does all parties a disservice and demonstrates a paucity of attention granted to China’s 
neighbours. One cannot help but wonder what other details of local reporting have 
been elided.  
A limited view of the 
South China Sea 
disputes threatens 
to reduce the pool 
of available data 
on everything from 
emerging bilateral 
and multilateral 
arrangements to their 
potential economic 
impact on local industry 
and trade.
Media reporting on the South China Sea dispute
THESIGERS | SOVEREIGN DATA VOL. 1 NO. 5 (NOVEMBER 2015)
4
HOW TO SUBSCRIBE
Sovereign Data is published monthly 
and distributed direct to subscribers 
via email as a PDF attachment. 
Subscribers to the Reporting Service 
benefit from daily, weekly and monthly 
reporting and analysis.
Thesigers defines “sovereign” and 
“data” broadly, in order to more fully 
understand the risks and opportunities 
associated with knowledge in all its 
tributary forms – “information”, “data”, 
“evidence”, “intelligence”, and so on.
Thesigers’ view of sovereign data is 
that it contains essential elements of 
substance and form, of context and 
meaning — original, often perishable 
artefacts of information about people, 
places, events, issues and things.
Monthly Journal
Thesigers’ monthly journal, Sovereign 
Data, provides short, digestible 
analysis of the state of the information 
environment. Each monthly issue 
focuses on a single, current topic 
selected by Thesigers staff, given 
additional context and assessed for 
relevance and impact.
Reporting Service
Thesigers’ reporting service tracks 
current developments in sovereign 
data. Intended for clients who need 
more frequent, detailed updates, the 
service features summary reports and 
briefings based on locally-sourced 
news, data analytics, risk indexes and 
regular assessment.
Research and Development
Thesigers conducts ongoing research 
and development through a sense-
making program of workshops, 
system design and technology 
innovation. Workshops investigate 
problems covered in our reporting 
and analysis. Our systems and 
technology work creates working  
solutions to them.
For more information on the subject 
of this report, or to subscribe to our 
services, contact us directly at:
Email: subscriptions@thesigers.com 
Phone (UK): +44 (0)134 430 6541
Notes
1. For example, David Ignatius, ‘US, China in a maritime game of chicken in East Asia’, 
Stars and Stripes, 22 October 2015, http://tiny.cc/31hx5x. [Accessed 25 October 
2015.] 
2. For example, James Poulos, ‘A US-China war is unthinkable. It may also be inevita-
ble’, The Week, 8 April 2015, http://tiny.cc/22hx5x. [Accessed 27 October 2015.] 
3. Graham Allison, ‘The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China headed for war?’, The 
Atlantic, 24 September 2015, http://tiny.cc/l4hx5x. [Accessed 27 October 2015.]
4. International Crisis Group, Stirring Up the South China Sea (III): A Fleeting Opportuni-
ty for Calm, Brussels, 7 May 2015.
5. For background, see Thesigers’ previous reporting, e.g. Kit Dawnay, ‘Containing Chi-
na’s ambitions in the South China Sea’, Current Intelligence, 5 August 2010, http://tiny.
cc/i7hx5x. [Accessed 25 October 2015.]
6. Noah Millman, ‘Can the US and China avoid war? History says otherwise’, The Week, 
19 October 2015, http://tiny.cc/v8hx5x. [Accessed 3 November 2015.]
7. Alex Calvo, ‘A survey of Western sources in Vietnam’s South China Sea narrative’, 
Issue Briefings 11, South China Sea Think Tank, Taipei, 2015.
8. ‘South China Sea dispute overshadows ASEAN summit’, The Diplomat, 12 May 2014, 
http://tiny.cc/x9hx5x. [Accessed 25 October 2015.]
9. ‘Two more Kilo-class submarines are commissioned’, Thanh Nien News, 1 August 
2015, http://tiny.cc/saix5x. [Accessed 25 October 2015.]
10. ‘Japan promises ships to Vietnam amid South China Sea fears’, Agence France-
Presse, 15 September 2015.
11. ‘Japanese soldiers could fight abroad again after security bill passed’, The Guardian, 
18 September 2015, http://tiny.cc/mcix5x. [Accessed 25 October 2015.] 
12. ‘China: Japan security legislation a “nightmare scenario”’, The Diplomat, 17 July 2015, 
http://tiny.cc/adix5x. [Accessed 25 October 2015.]
13. ‘PH hails Japan security bill’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 September 2015, http://tiny.
cc/9dix5x. [Accessed 25 October 2015.]
14. ‘Philippines backs US plan to sail ship near Chinese island’, The Hindu, 13 October 
2015, http://tiny.cc/xfix5x. [Accessed 25 October 2015.]
15. ‘China must drop “deceitful rhetoric” on disputed sea ¬– DND’, The Daily Tribune, 7 
September 2015, http://goo.gl/Zvjcv4. [Accessed 25 October 2015.]
16. ‘China angered by Philippine documentary on South China Sea’, Reuters, 29 June 
2015.
17. ‘Don’t excessively interpret South China Sea drill’, Xinhua, 26 July 2015.
18. Permanent Court of Arbitration, ‘Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines 
and the People’s Republic of China’, press release, 29 October 2015, http://tiny.cc/
iiix5x. [Accessed 9 November 2015.]
19. ‘Reporting the South China Sea dispute: Lack of context still an issue’, Center for Me-
dia Freedom and Responsibility, Manila, 31 July 2015, http://tiny.cc/6iix5x. [Accessed 
25 October 2015.]
20. Veejay Calutan, ‘Framing analysis of ASEAN online news media coverage of South 
China Sea dispute between China and the Philippines’, MA thesis, University of the 
Philippines Diliman, Quezon City, June 2015.
21. Andrew Chubb, Exploring China’s ‘Maritime Consciousness’: Public Opinion on the 
South and East China Sea Disputes, Perth: US Asia Centre, 2014.
22. Christopher P. Cavas, ‘China’s “Little Blue Men” take Navy’s place in disputes’, De-
fenseNews, 2 November 2015, http://tiny.cc/ekix5x. [Accessed 9 November 2015.]
23. ‘China’s cyber spies take to high seas as hack attacks spike’, Bloomberg, 15 October 
2015.
